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CONGRESS IN RELIEF: THE ECONOMIC
IMPORTANCE OF REVOKING BASEBALL'S
ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 26, 1996, the owners of the thirty major
league baseball teams voted twenty-six to four to ratify a new
collective bargaining agreement ("Agreement") with the Ma-
jor League Baseball Players Association ("MLBPA") effective
until the year 2000, with an MLBPA option to extend the
Agreement until 2001.1 The MLBPA approved the Agree-
ment on December 5, 1996,2 and it was officially approved on
March 13, 1997.' While those involved with baseball gener-
ally viewed the agreement as a significant breakthrough, as
it assured at least five seasons without labor strife,4 the
Agreement is only a temporary respite from future labor
animosity. Since 1972, there have been eight work-stoppages
in baseball,5 the most recent was a 232 day strike that began
August 12, 1994 and eliminated the last seven and a half
weeks of the 1994 regular season, the 1994 playoffs, the
World Series, and the first three and a half weeks of the 1995
schedule.6
Based on the pattern of coercive tactics, such as strikes
by the players and lock-outs by the owners, aimed at forcing
one side to concede to the other's demands, it is apparent
that more stability is required to quell the reoccurring labor
animosity in baseball. One major impediment to efficient ne-
gotiations is Major League Baseball's exemption to federal
antitrust laws. The exemption, in effect, acts to remove the
possibility that, in the event of a bargaining impasse, the
MLBPA can dissolve and sue the owners for collusive bar-
1. Baseball Labor Agreement Now Official, NEWSDAY, Mar. 15, 1997, at
A34.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Baseball Strike 1994: Baseball Labor Chronology (visited Mar. 16, 1997)
<http://www.nando.net/newsroom/ap/ baseball/strike/history.html> (copy on file
with the Santa Clara Law Review) [hereinafter Baseball Labor Chronology].
6. Baseball Labor Agreement Now Official, NEWSDAY, Mar. 15, 1997, at
A34.
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gaining tactics. This allows the union to resist more easily
conceding to any terms which may result in drawn out nego-
tiations, as occurred during the 1994 strike.
The best way to provide this stability is for Congress to
pass legislation lifting baseball's antitrust exemption,
thereby removing the inherent bargaining advantage that the
exemption provides the owners.7 Lifting the exemption will
in turn assuage the damage that baseball has suffered in
terms of its fan support and public image as the "national
pastime,"8 and will help to preserve the future of baseball as
a business enterprise.
This comment first explains the background of baseball's
unique exemption from antitrust laws, how the exemption
applies today in light of the present collective bargaining
agreement, and case law that has limited the usefulness of
the court-granted exemption.9 The comment also focuses on
the other effects of the antitrust exemption on baseball as a
business, such as the ability of the owners to block existing
franchises from relocating." By blocking the moves, owners
are able to extort huge sums of money from expansion cities."
Additionally, this comment demonstrates how these practices
have had the effect of insulating the owners in larger mar-
kets from financial danger and widening the disparity be-
tween small and large market teams." Finally, this comment
proposes that Congress intervene and pass legislation mak-
ing the baseball owners subject to antitrust laws.13
7. See infra Part IV.
8. Baseball was recognized as "the preeminent American sport" in the
Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 205 (1922), decision. The Court also noted that
"millions of people follow the daily results of the games in the press." Id. How-
ever, today, baseball is being replaced by basketball and football in terms of fan
interest. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.B.4.
11. See infra Part III.B.3.
12. See infra Part III.B.4.
13. See infra Part V.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Sherman Act
1. Overview
In order to promote competition and prevent unlawful
restraints of trade and monopolies, Congress passed the
Sherman Act ("the Act") on July 2, 1890.1' The Act, in effect,
codified common law principles of trade restraints that
banned anti-competitive arrangements, such as price-fixing
cartels.15 Section 1 of the Act proclaims that "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 6 Section 2
provides that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or at-
tempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
shall be deemed guilty of a felony." 7
Section 1 was intended to prevent cartels, horizontal
mergers of monopolistic proportions, and predatory business
tactics, while section 2 of the Act was intended to protect
consumers by preventing one or a few large companies from
dominating a market. 8 The basic premise underlying the Act
is the assumption that free competition among business enti-
ties will produce the best price levels. 9 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has interpreted the Act to propose that collu-
sion among competitors may produce prices which harm con-
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
15. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 20 (1983).
16. 15. U.S.C. § 1 (1994); see United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148
F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945) (holding that in order to fall within section 2 of the
Act the monopolist must have both the power to monopolize, and the intent to
monopolize).
17. 15. U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
18. BORK, supra note 15, at 19-20. The main policy behind the laws was to
advance consumer welfare. Id. at 21. The 53d Congress recognized that higher
prices were brought out by a restriction on output, and a main policy goal of the
antitrust laws were to prevent the monopolistic tendency to restrain output.
Id.
19. National Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695
(1978).
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20
sumers.
2. Analysis of the Law
The Supreme Court has had extensive experience in
dealing with antitrust violations in business and industry. In
United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co.,2 the Court laid out
the requirements for a per se violation of section 1 of the Act:
"[a]ny combination formed for the purpose and with the effect
of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price
of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal
per se."22 More recently, the Court summed up the criteria for
a per se violation by holding that it is per se illegal, when the
"surrounding circumstances make the likelihood of anti-
competitive conduct so great as to render unjustified further
examination of the challenged conduct." 2
When the particular violation is not one that can be con-
demned as a per se violation, the Court has applied the Rule
of Reason analysis to determine if the activity in question is
an "unreasonable" restraint of trade. 4 In order to determine
whether an activity fails to satisfy the Rule of Reason, the
Court considers "whether the restraint imposed ... merely
regulates and perhaps ... promotes competition or
whether... it may suppress or even destroy competition."25
If it is the latter, then the restraint will likely be found un-
reasonable.26
The Court has recognized that, in some cases, some col-
20. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-26 n.59
(1940).
21. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
22. Id. at 223.
23. NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101-02 (1984).
24. Addyson Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (stating,
in dicta, that if restraint of trade is ancillary to the main and lawful purpose of
the contract, it may escape per se classification and may also be acceptable un-
der the Rule of Reason balancing).
25. Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). Justice
Brandeis, writing the opinion of the Court, set up the following criteria for the
Court to consider in determining the reasonability of a restraint: "[1] the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; [2] its condition be-
fore and after the restraint was imposed; [and 3] the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual or probable." Id. "The history of the restraint, the evil be-
lieved to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, [and] the purpose
or end sought to be attained are all relevant facts." Id.
26. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104.
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laboration is needed in order to offer a good to the public.7 In
that case, the Court will apply the Rule of Reason to deter-
mine whether the restraint of trade is outweighed by the
benefit that the agreement provides to consumers. 28  The
Court has consistently recognized that in sports some col-
laboration is needed in order to have a competitive league
and to offer a product to the public.29 In NCAA v. Board of
Regents of University of Oklahoma,"° the Court was faced
with an agreement among member colleges of the NCAA to
restrict how often a particular team's games could be shown
on television. 1 The Court held that the agreement was not
illegal per se because it recognized that, as in Broadcast Mu-
sic, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. ,32 some or-
ganization of and restraints on competition are needed to al-
low for college football games to exist."3 The colleges must
agree on rules, such as rules of the games themselves and
rules of player eligibility.34
By combining all of the member schools into a single
athletic association, the NCAA has enabled a product to be
marketed which might otherwise be unavailable. Without a
league, there would be no competition.35 For these reasons,
the Court allowed the NCAA to justify the plaintiffs re-
straints instead of condemning them as illegal per se.36 As
justification for the restraint of not allowing each school to
negotiate its own television contract, the NCAA claimed that
the plan promoted equality throughout the NCAA and al-
lowed colleges to focus on academics and not on profits.37 The
NCAA argued that this agreement allowed member schools to
achieve this stated goal because each school does not have to
worry about negotiating its own television contract. 38 How-
27. Id. at 117.
28. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979)
(holding that the establishment of a "blanket license" was reasonable because it
offered an otherwise unavailable product and consumers could go elsewhere for
the individual licenses).
29. NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984).
30. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
31. Id. at 91-94.
32. Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 6.
33. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 102.
34. Id. at 117.
35. NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102-03 (1984).
36. Id. at 117.
37. Id. at 102.
38. Id.
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ever, despite these arguments, the Court held that the chal-
lenged restraint did not enhance competition and that there
were less intrusive means of achieving its goal of having a
competitive league."
3. Modern Antitrust Policy
The goal of modern antitrust policy has moved away
from looking to protect the small competitor and has instead
focused on economic efficiency.4" The courts, as well as the
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, have
loosened their grip on prosecuting monopolistic behavior
when the conduct benefits the consumer.4'
B. Baseball's History with Antitrust Laws
1. A Local Affair
The Supreme Court was first faced with determining
whether baseball was susceptible to antitrust legislation in
Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League
of Professional Baseball Clubs. 42 In this case, the plaintiff
was a baseball club incorporated in Maryland, which, along
with seven other teams, made up the Federal League of Pro-
fessional Baseball.43 The plaintiff alleged that the defendants
were guilty of an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade when
they purchased some of the constituent clubs of the Federal
League and induced all of the clubs except for the plaintiff to
leave their league and join the National League. 4 The plain-
tiff argued that baseball is susceptible to antitrust laws for
the following reasons: (1) baseball constitutes interstate
commerce; (2) an interstate relationship exists between clubs
located in different states; (3) organized baseball generates
an enormous amount of wealth; (4) baseball is an engage-
39. Id. at 119. Specifically, the Court said that the television restriction did
not produce "any greater measure of equality throughout the NCAA than would
a restriction on alumni contributions, tuition rates, or any other revenue pro-
ducing activity." Id.
40. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 4
(1976).
41. Id. at 5; see also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979)
(holding that Congress designed the Sherman Act as a "consumer welfare pre-
scription").
42. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
43. Id. at 207.
44. Id.
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ment in moneymaking; (5) gate receipts were divided by
agreement between the home club and the visiting club; and
(6) there is a great difference between playing baseball for
sport and the business of baseball.45 Nevertheless, the Su-
preme Court unanimously held otherwise.46 In the opinion of
the Court, Justice Holmes wrote that giving exhibitions of
baseball is a business of purely state affairs.47 The fact that
by giving these exhibitions people may cross state lines is
"merely incident, not the essential thing" of the business.48
Justice Holmes concluded that "personal effort, not related to
production, is not a subject of commerce," and it does not be-
come commerce because there is some transportation in-
volved.49
2. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore Followed
Courts have repeatedly cited Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore as the authority in cases attacking baseball on an-
titrust grounds." In Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.,51 a
per curiam opinion, the plaintiffs, professional baseball play-
ers, alleged that the reserve clause in their contract" was a
violation of the Act because it was an illegal restraint on
trade.53 The Court disagreed, based on the precedent of Fed-
eral Baseball Club of Baltimore." Furthermore, the Court
45. Id. at 201-206.
46. Id. at 206.
47. Id. at 208.
48. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Prof'l
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922).
49. Id. at 209.
50. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 272 (1972).
51. Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
52. The reserve clause gives the club in organized baseball that first signs a
player a continuing and exclusive right to that player's services. Michael L.
Kaplan, Annotation, Application of Federal Antitrust Laws to Professional
Sports, 18 A.L.R. FED. 489, 515 (1996). That right is recognized and enforced
by all the other clubs. Id. Therefore, once a player signs a contract with a
team, he has no option but to come to an agreement with the team with which
he is under contract because no other team is allowed to negotiate with him.
Id. Recent collective bargaining agreements, however, have somewhat elimi-
nated this restraint on player moves since the players are granted free agency
after six years of service time in Major League Baseball. See discussion infra
Part II.D.
53. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 362. The Court did note, however, that it was "a
contradiction in terms" to say that baseball does not involve interstate com-
merce. Id.
54. Id. at 357.
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noted that if there are evils which warrant antitrust laws to
be applied to baseball, it is Congress' responsibility to impose
them.55
The Court's decision to reaffirm Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore and to leave it to Congress to change the law was
based partly on a 1952 report prepared by the Subcommittee
on the Study of Monopoly Power of the House of Representa-
tives Committee on the Judiciary.56  The report stated
"[u]nder judicial interpretations of [the commerce clause], the
Congress has power to investigate, and pass legislation
dealing with professional baseball.., if that business is, or
affects, interstate commerce.""7 The Court, therefore, as-
serted that stare decisis6 must prevail, but that it would de-
fer to any Congressional findings regarding baseball's effect
on interstate commerce."
3. Flood v. Kuhn: A Deference to Precedent
Flood v. Kuhn,'° the Supreme Court's most recent deci-
sion concerning baseball and the federal antitrust laws, dealt
55. Id.
56. Id. at 358-59 (Burton, J., dissenting).
57. H.R. REP. No. 2002, 82d Cong. at 4 (1952).
58. Stare decisis, a Latin phrase, is judicial doctrine which means "to abide
by, or adhere to, decided cases." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990).
When the Supreme Court reexamines a prior holding, "its judgment is custom-
arily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed
to test the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of
law, and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling the prior
case." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992). A court may
consider the following factors in its decision to reaffirm or overrule: (1)
whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hard-
ship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudia-
tion; (2) whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have left
the old rule obsolete; or (3) whether the facts have so changed or come to be
perceived so differently so to have changed usefulness or justification of the old
rule. Id. at 854-55.
59. Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 359 (1963) (Burton, J. dis-
senting). Toolson was decided along with two other cases, Kowalski v. Chan-
dler, 202 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1953), affd, 436 U.S. 356 (1953) and Corbett v.
Chandler, 202 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1953), affd 436 U.S. 356 (1953). While neither
of these two cases dealt with the reserve clause, the fact that they were af-
firmed may suggest that that the Court understood baseball's exemption to ex-
tend beyond the reserve system. Larry C. Smith, Beyond the Peanuts and
Cracker Jacks: Repealing Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 67 U. COLO. L. REV.
113, 119 n.43 (1996).
60. 407 U.S. 258 (1972). Flood died of throat cancer in Los Angeles on
January 20, 1997. Jon Heyman, True Champion: Flood Dies, NEWSDAY, Jan.
21, 1997, at A62.
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once again with the reserve clause.6 In Flood, Curtis Flood,
the plaintiff, was traded to the Philadelphia Phillies in 1969
after a twelve season all-star career with the Saint Louis
Cardinals.62 In December 1969, Flood complained to the
Commissioner of Baseball and asked that he be made a free
agent and be allowed to strike his own bargain with any
other major league team.63 When the Commissioner refused,
Flood brought an antitrust suit, alleging that the reserve
clause, which binds his services to one club, was too restric-
tive and is an unreasonable restraint on trade.64
Justice Blackmun, in writing the opinion of the Court,
reached the following conclusions: (1) professional baseball is
a business which is engaged in interstate commerce;
65
(2) with its reserve system enjoying exemption from the fed-
eral antitrust laws, baseball is an exception and an anom-
aly;66 (3) the Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore and Toolson
cases have become aberrations confined to baseball;67 (4) the
cases are fully entitled to the benefit of stare decisis;68 (5) the
exemption rests on a recognition and an acceptance of base-
ball's unique characteristics and needs;69 (6) baseball has
been allowed to develop and expand unhindered by federal
legislation action;7" and (7) a judicial overturning of Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore would cause retroactivity prob-
lems. 7" Therefore, if any change is to be made in baseball's
exemption, it should come by Congressional legislation.
4. Recent Signs of Limiting the Exemption in Lower
Courts
Two lower court cases which arose from the same factual
underpinnings have held that baseball's exemption should be
limited to the reserve clause.7" A group of investors, includ-
61. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
62. See id. at 264-65.
63. Id. at 265.
64. Id. at 265-67.
65. Id. at 282.
66. Id.
67. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 282-83.
70. Id. at 282.
71. Id. at 282-84.
72. Id.
73. Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
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ing Vincent Piazza, a plaintiff in Piazza v. Major League
Baseball,7" sought to purchase the San Francisco Giants and
move them to Tampa Bay.75 In order to accomplish this pur-
chase, the plaintiffs formed a partnership called the Tampa
Bay Baseball Club, Ltd." The investors executed a letter of
intent to purchase the team for $115 million from the Giants
owner, Robert Lurie. 7 In return, Lurie agreed not to negoti-
ate with any other investors and to use his best efforts to ob-
tain approval from the rest of the owners.78 The sale was not
approved by the owners.79 Rather, an alternate sale was ap-
proved to other investors who paid only $100 million for the
Giants." The owners approved this deal because it would
keep the Giants in San Francisco.8
In the Piazza case, the plaintiffs brought suit asserting
that the defendants violated sections 1 and 2 of the Act be-
cause Major League Baseball has "monopolized the market
for Major League Baseball teams and that [it] has placed di-
rect and indirect restraints on the purchase, sale, transfer,
relocation of, and competition for such teams."82 The plain-
tiffs claimed that these actions unlawfully restrained and
impeded their opportunities to engage in the business of Ma-
jor League Baseball.83
(limiting the exemption to the reserve system); Butterworth v. National
League of Profl Baseball Clubs, 644 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 1994) (limiting the exemp-
tion to the reserve system). But see McCoy v. Major League Baseball, 911 F.
Supp. 454, 457 (W.D. Pa. 1995) (holding that the exemption extends to the en-
tire "business of baseball").
74. 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
75. Id. at 421.
76. Id. at 422.
77. Id.
78. Id. Approval of two-thirds of the owners is required for a franchise to
be moved. Id.
79. Id. at 423.
80. Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 423 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 423-24. The plaintiffs also brought federal claims that their First
and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution were violated and that that they
were deprived of their privileges and immunities guaranteed by Article IV, sec-
tion 2 of the Constitution. Id. at 423.
83. Id. at 423-24. Football owners have been found guilty of unreasonably
restraining trade when collaborating to prevent franchise relocation. See Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d
1381 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming district court's finding that football owners un-
reasonably restrained trade by preventing the Oakland Raiders from relocating
to Los Angeles); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football
League, 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming treble damage jury verdict in
favor of the Coliseum).
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In order to determine the scope of baseball's antitrust
exemption after Flood, the Piazza court analyzed the value of
stare decisis. The court first explained that the American
rule of stare decisis binds courts to adhere not only to results,
but also to the rationales for results.84 The Piazza court rec-
ognized that although lower courts are bound by Supreme
Court decisions, the Supreme Court may change the standard
or result established in an earlier case if it determines it is
"unsound in principle or unworkable in practice."85 When the
Piazza court interpreted Flood, it concluded that Flood effec-
tively removed the "rule stare decisis" of Federal Baseball
Club of Baltimore and Toolson by declaring that baseball is
interstate commerce.86 The Piazza court also determined
that the Supreme Court established a new rule that the ex-
emption applies only to the reserve clause. 7 Thus, the Piazza
court concluded the lower courts are no longer bound to fol-
low the broad rule in Toolson and Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore.88
The Piazza court is the only federal court that has inter-
preted baseball's antitrust exemption so narrowly, but the
case was followed by the Florida Supreme Court in Butter-
worth v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs.89
After the baseball owners voted against the sale of the Giants
to the Tampa Bay investment group and Robert Lurie signed
a contract to sell the team to a group of San Francisco inves-
tors, Florida Attorney General Robert Butterworth issued an-
titrust civil investigative demands ("CIDs") to the National
League of Professional Baseball Clubs and to its president,
William D. White."°  The circuit court issued an order
quashing the CID's, stating that "decisions concerning own-
ership and location of baseball franchises clearly fall within
the ambit of baseball's antitrust exemption."" The Florida
84. Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 437.
85. Id. at 438 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 691-92
(3d Cir. 1991)).
86. Id. at 437-38.
87. Id. at 438.
88. Id. Note that Tampa Bay, along with Arizona, was given an expansion
franchise to start play in 1998. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
89. 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994).
90. Id. A CID may be given by the Attorney General of Florida to anyone
he has reason to believe may have information relevant to a civil antitrust pro-
ceeding. Id. at 1022 n.2.
91. Id. at 1022.
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Supreme Court overruled and cited the rationale in Piazza to
support its decision." The Butterworth court reasoned that
since Flood stated that professional baseball "is engaged in
interstate commerce,"" which contradicts Federal Baseball
Club of Baltimore's holding that baseball exhibitions are
"purely state affairs" and do not constitute interstate com-
merce,94 the precedential value of Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore and Toolson are limited to their facts.9 Therefore,
the court concluded that baseball's antitrust exemption ap-
plies only to the reserve clause.96
These two cases demonstrate a judicial step toward lim-
iting baseball's exemption. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
has not specifically addressed the matter, and lower federal
courts have not followed the Piazza and Butterworth hold-
ings. For instance, in the 1995 decision in McCoy v. Major
League Baseball,97 the court rejected the holdings in Piazza
and Butterworth.98 The McCoy court recognized that the ex-
emption applied to all aspects of the business of baseball.9 In
so doing, the McCoy court quoted from the concluding para-
graph of the Flood decision, which, in essence, stated that the
business of baseball is not within the scope of federal anti-
trust laws.' 0 Moreover, the McCoy court underscored that
the Supreme Court retains the exclusive privilege of revers-
ing itself on this issue.' Therefore, the Piazza, Butterworth,
92. Id. at 1025.
93. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972).
94. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Profl
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922).
95. Butterworth v. National League of Profl Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d
1021, 1025 (Fla. 1994).
96. Id.
97. 911 F. Supp. 454, 457 (W.D. Wa. 1995). The dispute in McCoy arose out
of the December 1993 impasse between the owners of the twenty-eight Major
League Baseball teams and the players which, ultimately, lead to the 1994
baseball players strike. Id. at 454. The National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") had filed suit against the owners and players for unfair labor prac-
tices. Id. Thereafter, the plaintiffs (both fans and businesses owners) sued the
MLB owners for antitrust violations. Id. However, the court ultimately
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss because (1) the antitrust exemption
precluded plaintiffs claims, and (2) the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring such
claims. Id.
98. Id. at 457.
99. McCoy v. Major League Baseball, 911 F. Supp. 454, 457 (W.D. Wa.
1995).
100. Id. (citing Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 285 (1972)).
101. Id. (citing Salerno v. American League of Profl Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d
1234 [Vol. 38
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and McCoy decisions do not provide guidance as to where the
Supreme Court would stand if these lower court decisions
were heard regarding the scope of the baseball's antitrust ex-
emption.
A case which could prove instrumental in determining
the scope of the exemption is the recently filed lawsuit by
New York Yankees owner, George Steinbrenner.'0 On May
5, 1997, Steinbrenner filed suit in a federal district court in
Tampa Bay, Florida against the other twenty-nine owners of
Major League Baseball for "collaborating in a merchandising
cartel that favors weak teams."' °3 The suit concerns base-
ball's executive council's order to the Yankees to cease and
desist from selling Yankee tee shirts with Adidas logos on
them at Yankee Stadium because baseball has a joint mar-
keting agreement with another label.' The outcome of this
case will depend on the court's application of the breadth of
the antitrust laws. Given that the case is filed in Florida and
is bound by the Butterworth decision, it is likely that it will
be decided the same way as Piazza and Butterworth in the
lower court and that the exemption will be limited to the re-
serve clause.
B. Antitrust and Collective Bargaining: The Labor
Exemptions
The MLBPA, the union which still exists today, was
formed in December of 1953 to represent the needs of the
modern Major League Baseball player.'0 ' The MLBPA enjoys
1003, 1005 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971)).
102. Steve Zipay, Boss In Trouble: Suit May Lead to Ban, NEWSDAY, May 8,
1997, at A94.
103. Id. Steinbrenner also alleges that baseball "runs a cartel for the li-
censing of club trademarks" and has required the Yankees and Adidas to reveal
confidential competitive information to competitors." Id.
104. Id. In 1984, baseball clubs agreed to divide licensing and merchandis-
ing income from club trademarks equally. Id. This agreement is similar to
those made by Dallas Cowboys owner Jerry Jones which circumvented the
agreement NFL owners made with NFL Properties which allowed NFL proper-
ties to market the league and individual team trademarks jointly. Peter King,
Making Waves, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 7, 1996, at 34. Jones signed an indi-
vidual deal with Nike for $17.5 million and with Pepsi for $40 million. Id. The
league filed suit, but dropped the suit after Jones counter-sued for antitrust
violations. NFL and Dallas Cowboys Drop Suits Arising from Sponsorship Dis-
pute, ENT. LITIG. REP., Jan. 30, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Entlit
File [hereinafter Dallas Cowboys Drop Suits]. For a discussion of the Stein-
brenner versus Jones suits, see infra Part III.B.2.
105. GEORGE W. SCHUBERT, SPORTS LAW § 6.1 (1986). Baseball players first
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the same statutory and non-statutory exemption to antitrust
laws that all labor unions enjoy."'
1. Statutory and Non-Statutory Labor Exemption
Labor unions enjoy a statutory labor exemption from the
antitrust laws that originated in the Clayton Act 107 and the
Norris-La Guardia Act."0 8 The exemption allows unions to
enter into agreements that could eliminate competition from
other unions and give a union a virtual monopoly of all or-
ganizational activities in a particular industry.' 9 Congress
furthered the union exemption from antitrust laws by pass-
ing the National Labor Relations Act,10 which granted the
exception to parties engaged in collective bargaining."' Col-
lective bargaining is a device that stems from the National
Labor Relations Act and permits a majority of the workers in
a particular industry to be represented by a union, which will
then bargain for the group it represents. ' The individuals
thus lose their right to bargain separately.'
In addition to the statutory labor exemption, case law
has created a non-statutory labor exemption. The Supreme
Court has allowed collusive arrangements by both labor and
management which otherwise would violate section 1 of the
Sherman Act when the conduct occurs during collective bar-
gaining and is necessary to further the bargaining process."
One avenue that other sports' unions have used to pre-
vent owners from using this exemption to unreasonably re-
strict the players from changing teams and getting higher
salaries is to decertify the union and sue."5 This allows the
attempt to unionize came in 1885 when they formed the Brotherhood of Profes-
sional Baseball Players. See ROBERT F. BURK, NEVER JUST A GAME: PLAYERS,
OWNERS AND AMERICAN BASEBALL TO 1920, at 96 (1994). After its formation,
players wages increased dramatically. Id. at 99. The Brotherhood formed am
independent league called the Players National League of Baseball Clubs. Id.
at 105. The League fell apart in 1891 due to financial problems. Id. at 112. For
a complete summary of the history of baseball's labor developments prior to
1921, see id.
106. Schubert, supra note 105, § 6.1.
107. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1994).
108. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1994).
109. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 231 (1996).
110. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
115. See McNeil v. National Football League, 790 F. Supp 871 (D. Minn.
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players to allege collusive behavior in violation of the Act.
The tactic has been very successful in football to gain free
agency."6 In addition, the threat of a dissolution of the Na-
tional Basketball League Player' Association expedited the
signing of a new collective bargaining agreement and pre-
vented a strike before the 1996-97 season.
Mackey v. National Football League"' is the landmark
case which has applied the non-statutory labor exemption to
professional sports. This case dealt with the legality of the
"Rozelle Rule," which provided that when a player's contract
expired and the player signed with another team, the new
team had to compensate the former team with either addi-
tional players, money, or a draft pick."9 If the teams could
not reach an agreement on compensation, then NFL Com-
missioner Pete Rozelle would determine the outcome, and his
decision was binding.' Thirty-six players filed suit against
the NFL charging that the Rozelle Rule constituted an illegal
combination in restraint of trade by denying professional
football players the right to freely contract for their serv-
ices."'
In order to determine if the players' claim would be un-
dermined by the labor exemption to antitrust law because it
was the product of collective bargaining, the court laid out a
three-part test that must be met for the exemption to be
granted."' First, the alleged restraint on trade must primar-
ily affect only the parties in the collective bargaining rela-
tionship."' Second, the agreement must concern a manda-
1992).
116. Id.
117. Darryl Van Duch, NBA Vote Blocks Drive to Lift Antitrust Exemption,
NAT'L L.J., Sept. 25, 1995, at 1. Patrick Ewing, the star center for the New
York Knicks, had filed an antitrust suit in Minneapolis federal district court.
Id. Since the NBA Players Association voted not to decertify, Ewing dropped
his suit. Id.
118. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
119. Id. at 610. This rule was known as the "Rozelle Rule" and was named
for the commissioner of the NFL at the time, Pete Rozelle. Id. at 609. Pete Ro-
zelle died of brain cancer on December 6, 1996. Former NFL Commissioner Ro-
zelle Dies, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 7, 1996, at C1. He was elected into
the Pro Football Hall-of-Fame in 1985. Id.
120. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 610.
121. Id. at 610. In 1957, the Supreme Court had held that professional foot-
ball was subject to antitrust laws in Radovich v. National Football League, 352
U.S. 445, 452 (1957). See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
122. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
123. Id.
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tory subject of collective bargaining.' Finally, antitrust laws
will be overridden by the policy favoring collective bargaining
when the agreement sought to be exempted is the product of
bona fide, arm's length bargaining.'2
The Mackey court concluded that the third prong, arms'
length bargaining, was not met because the players did not
ever consider the rule before it was implemented.'26 There-
fore, the Rozelle Rule was not exempt from an antitrust suit
by the players.'27 While this case set the standard for apply-
ing the labor exemption for collective bargaining in profes-
sional sports to antitrust laws, the strict application of its
rules against the owners was loosened by the Supreme Court
in Brown v. Pro Football.
12 8
Brown has severely limited the application of antitrust
legislation on collective bargaining in professional sports.
129
Like Mackey, Brown dealt with the immunity that arose from
what the Supreme Court has called the "non-statutory" labor
exemption from the antitrust laws.13° As discussed previ-
ously, the Court has implied this exemption from federal la-
bor statutes, which set forth a national labor policy favoring
free and private collective bargaining.''
The Brown case arose when the National Football
League ("NFL"), and the NFL Player's Association, a labor
union, began to negotiate a new collective bargaining agree-
ment in March of 1989 to replace the old one that had expired
in 1987.132 The owners proposed a plan that would allow each
team to establish a "developmental squad" of up to six first
year players who, as free agents, had failed to secure a posi-
tion on a regular player roster.'33 The owners plan called for
124. Id.
125. Id.; see also Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel
Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
126. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
127. Id. at 616.
128. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
129. Id. at 231.
130. Id. at 235-36; see Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamerfitters Lo-
cal Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975); see also, Local Union No. 189, Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
131. Brown, 518 U.S. at 236; see supra notes 82-84.
132. Brown, 518 U.S. at 234.
133. Id. In general, each team is limited to a roster of fifty-four active play-
ers and any player that is not on the active roster at the beginning of the sea-
son and is not on the injured reserve is declared a free agent.
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all the team's to pay the squad players a fixed salary.13 ' The
owners presented the plan to the NFL Players Association,
who subsequently rejected the salary offer of $1000 per week,
and instead argued that the squad players should be able to
negotiate their own salaries."' Two months later, negotia-
tions met an impasse, the NFL unilaterally implemented the
developmental squad program, and advised club owners that
not strictly following the $1000 a week salary would result in
disciplinary action, including the loss of draft choices.
136
In May 1990, this suit was brought by 235 practice squad
players against the league and its member teams on the
grounds that the employers' agreement to implement the
$1000 weekly salary violated section 1 of the Act. 137 The Fed-
eral District Court denied the owners claim of antitrust ex-
emption and the players eventually prevailed with a jury
verdict awarding them treble damages of over $30 million.'38
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 9  The Supreme Court held in a 8-1
decision written by Justice Breyer, with Justice Stevens dis-
senting, that the non-statutory antitrust exemption applies
in this case because "[the employer conduct] grew out of, and
was directly related to, the lawful operation of the bargaining
process," "[i]t involved a matter that the parties were re-
quired to negotiate collectively," and "it concerned only the
parties to the collective-bargaining relationship. "40
134. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 234 (1996).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 235.
137. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
138. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 231 (1996). The immunity the
owners sought was derived from a "nonstatutory" labor exemption from the an-
titrust laws. Id. at 235; see also Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Streamer-
fitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975); Local Union No. 189, Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965). The Court has
implied this exemption from federal labor statutes, which set forth a national
labor policy favoring free and private collective bargaining. Brown, 518 U.S. at
236; see also 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
139. Brown, 518 U.S. at 235.
140. Id. at 250. In applying this standard, which is essentially the one set
out in Mackey, Justice Breyer noted that the "holding is not intended to insu-
late from antitrust review every joint imposition of terms by employers, for an
agreement among employers could be sufficiently distant in time and in cir-
cumstance from the collective-bargaining process that a rule permitting anti-
trust intervention would not significantly interfere with that process." Id.
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E. The New Major League Baseball Collective Bargain
Agreement
On November 26, 1996, the MLBPA and the owners of
the thirty major league baseball teams reached an agreement
in principle for a new collective bargaining agreement.' The
major provisions of the new deal include a luxury tax and a
revenue sharing agreement.' Both are designed to benefit
the small market teams which have suffered greatly because
of their inability to pay as high of salaries as teams that draw
from larger markets as well as have a steady stream of in-
come from cable contracts.
4 3
The players' right to be free agents after six years of
service time in Major League Baseball was continued, 44 and
they were granted credit for major league service time for
regular-season games canceled by the strike.'4  As part of the
new collective bargaining agreement, owners and players
agreed to work with Congress to "clarify that Major League
141. Baseball Labor Agreement Now Official, NEWSDAY, Mar. 15, 1997, at
A34.
142. David Lennon, Baseball Strikes a Pact, NEWSDAY, Nov. 27, 1996 at A90.
The luxury tax calls for up to five teams to be taxed thirty-five percent of their
payroll over $51 million in 1997, 35% on amounts over $55 million in 1998, 34%
percent on amounts over $58.9 million in 1999, and the tax will disappear in
2000 and 2001. Id. The revenue sharing plan, which was first adopted by the
owners on March 21, 1996, was implemented to transfer money from the large
to the small market teams. Id. The formula begins at 60% for 1997, then in-
creases to 80% in 1998, 85% in 1999, and finally reaching 100% in 2000 and
2001. Id.
143. The New York Yankees have a cable contract signed in 1989 from Madi-
son Square Garden network that was worth $486 million over ten years. Tom
Verducci, New York Yankees; Too Much Is Enough, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar.
23, 1998, at 92. This money has allowed the Yankees to have a 1998 payroll of
over $70 million. Id. On the other side of the spectrum, the Pittsburgh Pirates
have a payroll of $13 million. Pirates See 3B, More Power in Trade Discussions,
SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, FL), May 11, 1998, at 3C.
144. Free agency got its roots in 1975 when an arbitrator declared that the
reserve clause meant that the team a which holds the player under the reserve
clause has the right to renew the player's expired contract for only one year,
making the player free to sign with another club after that time. See Kansas
City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players' Ass'n, 532 F.2d
615 (8th Cir. 1976). The terms of baseball's free agency were first implemented
in the collective bargaining agreement between Major League players and own-
ers in 1975. Neil Weiner, Major League Labor and Management (visited Nov. 3,
1996) <http://www. backgroundbriefing.com/baseball.html> (copy on file with
Santa Clara Law Review). After several years of major league service time, the
players are no longer the property of the team that originally signed them for
the duration of their careers. Id.
145. Lennon, supra note 142, at A90.
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Baseball players are covered under the antitrust laws [and]
have the same rights under antitrust laws as do other profes-
sional athletes."46 They also agreed not to change the appli-
cation of the antitrust laws on anything besides labor laws,
including franchise movements, broadcast rights and the
draft.4 7 The Bill will be called the Curt Flood Act of 1997, in
memory of Flood's efforts to implement free agency.
F. Recent Efforts to Limit or Remove the Exemption
Since the ruling in Toolson there have been more than
fifty bills introduced in Congress relative to baseball's exemp-
tion to antitrust laws, 8 some which expanded the exemption
and others that limited it.19  Congress has expressly granted
baseball, along with hockey, football, and basketball, an ex-
emption from antitrust laws for agreements covering tele-
casting of sports contests and combining of professional
leagues. 5 ° This exemption is limited to agreements where
owners are involved in selling rights to the sponsored tele-
casting of games. 5' Therefore, Congress explicitly did not
address the issues of antitrust arrangements in any other
contexts.
Last term, as a reaction to the labor wars in baseball
that have alienated many fans, both houses of Congress put
forth bills which would either completely strip baseball of any
unique exemptions relative to other sports, or which would
limit baseball's exemption to the reserve clause. 5 ' However,
none made it out of for a house vote. The closest a bill came
to being presented for vote was Senate Bill 627, the Profes-
sional Baseball Reform Act of 1995.18 The bill calls for all
antitrust laws that apply to other sports to be applicable to
146. Hatch Temporarily Sends Baseball Bill to the Showers, CONGRESS
DAILY/AM, May 2, 1997, available in WESTLAW, 1997 WL 8214608.
147. Id.
148. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 281 (1972).
149. Id.
150. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
151. 15 U.S.C. § 1294 (1994).
152. S. 627, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 415, 104th Cong. (1995) (amending the
Clayton Act to apply to Major League Baseball with respect to labor relations
between management and labor); H.R. 386, 104th Cong. (1995) (applying anti-
trust laws to reverse Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National
League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 258 (1922), Toolson v. N.Y.
Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972)).
153. S. 627, 104th Cong. (1995).
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professional baseball as well.5 The bill, which was intro-
duced by Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) passed the Senate
Judiciary committee by a 9 to 8 vote on August 3, 1996155 but
was held up in the 100 person Senate and died on October 3,
1996.' Senator Hatch said that the bill died with the strong
approval mark of 60 votes and that he was optimistic about
its future.157 Additionally, the bill passed the Judiciary
Committee again on July 31, 1997 by an 11 to 6 vote."'
Nevertheless, work is already under way between the
players and the owners to hammer out a legislative proposal
to limit the exemption. In early April of 1997, owners' lob-
byist Bill Cable met with Gene Orza, the deputy chief of the
MLBPA, in order to begin the negotiations. 59 Under the law
they are drafting, the antitrust exemption "will remain in ef-
fect for team relocations, broadcasting contracts and the pro-
tection of minor league markets."6 ° Senator Hatch has tem-
porarily pulled his bill while owners and players try to reach
agreement on their own.' The impediment to the agreement
is that the owners want the exemptions that apply to the re-
maining aspects of the game to be codified.'62 Representative
Jim Bunning, a Republican from Kentucky, and a former
pitching star and baseball Hall of Fame Member, is waiting
to see the outcome of the Senate Bill before he enters a simi-
lar bill in the House.
163
154. Id.
155. Senate Panel Narrowly Approves Bill to Strip Baseball's Exemption (last
modified Aug. 3, 1995) <http://somerset.nando.net/newsroom.. ./feat/archive
/090395/mlb69021.html> (copy on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
156. Antitrust Bill Dies on Capitol Hill (visited Nov. 3, 1996)
<http://espnet.sportszone.comleditors/mlb/news/ 9610031aw.html> (copy on file
with the Santa Clara Law Review).
157. Id.
158. Senate Committee Revokes Part of Baseball's Antitrust Exemption
(visited July 31, 1997) <http://espnet.sportszone.com.mlb/news/970731
/00324091.html> (copy on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
159. Scorecard, Legislation, Excising Baseball's Exemption, SPORTS IL-
LUSTRATED, Mar. 31, 1997, at 29.
160. Id.
161. Hatch Temporarily Sends Baseball Bill to the Showers, CONGRESS
DAILY/AM, May 2, 1997, available in WESTLAW, 1997 WL 8214608.
162. Id. This would be a very bad move by Congress concerning the fran-
chise relocations. Baseball owners use the exemption to extort huge sums of
money. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
163. Id.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Collective Bargaining in Baseball: A Contradiction in
Terms
1. The New Collective Bargaining Agreement
The new collective bargaining agreement assures labor
peace through the year 2000 and possibly 2001."6 Interim
Commissioner Bud Selig announced the agreement by saying
"Ib]aseball fans can finally look forward to five years of unin-
terrupted play."'65 While it seemed like good news, Selig's
statement confirmed the fear of most of those who follow
baseball-that another labor war is likely to follow, the expi-
ration of this agreement."' The main problem that seems to
exist on the bargaining table is that the owners and the play-
ers view each other as adversaries and mistrust the other
party's claimed intentions.'67 This attitude leads to obstinate
behavior and a reluctance to compromise, as evidenced by the
eight work stoppages since 1972.8
2. The Antitrust Exemption and Labor: Owners Have
Substantial Leverage
The owners have a huge advantage in the bargaining
process, as most of them operate their baseball teams at a
loss and any of the losses that they suffer from work stop-
pages can be written off their taxes against earnings from
other businesses.'69 This tax write-off allows the owners to
hold-fast during strikes, and even implement lock-outs, such
as the thirty-two day lock-out in 1990 that the owners im-
posed until a new collective bargaining agreement was
reached. 7 ° Thus, the owners can hold out until terms they
desire are agreed upon.
The owners' ability to operate above the antitrust laws
164. Baseball Labor Agreement Now Official, NEWSDAY, Mar. 15, 1997, at
A34.
165. Id.
166. Gary Shelton, Don't Believe It: Baseball Is Not Back, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Nov. 28, 1996, at C1 (arguing the new agreement is not the panacea the
owners think it will be).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Baseball Labor Chronology, supra note 5.
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"handed the owners a huge club that gives them unique lev-
erage in bargaining and discourages them from accepting
reasonable terms."171 While this leverage has been mitigated
through collective bargaining,'72 often bargaining leverage
can be in the form of intimidation. Therefore, if the MLBPA
believes that exemption gives the owners an unfair bargain-
ing advantage, then it can hinder progress in negotiations.
As evidence of this, during the 232 day strike that wiped out
half of the 1994 season, including the World Series, Donald
Fehr, the head of the player's union, said that if Congress re-
pealed baseball's antitrust exemption, he would recommend
that the MLBPA end the strike.'
B. How Far Does The Exemption Reach?
1. The Supreme Court Decisions
Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore set the precedent for
holding that baseball should enjoy some exemption from anti-
trust laws. 7 " In that opinion, Justice Holmes determined
that the "business of baseball" is only a state affair 75 and the
transportation involved in the game was "mere incident."'76
While Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore is still cited as the
law in so far as it determines that Congress had no intention
of including the business of baseball within the scope of anti-
trust laws,'77 the rationale behind the holding that baseball
does not involve interstate commerce has been clearly re-
jected.7 8 In Flood, the Court considered the ramifications of
overturning Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, and rea-
171. Players Vow to End Strike if Exemption Repealed (visited Nov. 3, 1996)
<http'//www.nando.net/newsroom/ap/bbo/1995/mlb/mlb/02119573306.html>
(quoting a statement from a letter written by Orinn Hatch and Daniel Patrick
Moynihan to other senators) (copy on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
172. See supra Part III.A.
173. Players Vow to End Strike if Exemption Repealed (visited Nov. 3, 1996)
<http'/www.nando.net/newsroom/ap/bbo/1995/mlb/mlb/02119573306.html>
(copy on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
174. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Prof'l Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 207 (1922).
175. Id. at 208.
176. Id. at 209.
177. Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Flood v. Kuhn, 407
U.S. 258 (1972).
178. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357 (Burton, J., dissenting); Flood, 407 U.S. at
274; see also Joseph M. Piepul, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: The Limits of
Stare Decisis, 12 B.C. L. REV. 737 (1970-71).
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soned against it out of deference to precedent. 9 The Court
decided that it did not want to intervene and left it up to
Congress to lift the exemption.8 '
There is still, however, great ambiguity as to what extent
the Flood decision has left baseball's antitrust exemption in-
tact.' The facts particular to the case dealt exclusively with
the reserve clause, and the Supreme Court has not had occa-
sion to deal with any other aspect of baseball's business in
regards to antitrust legislation. Recently, however, two deci-
sions have been passed which argue that the antitrust ex-
emption applies only to the reserve clause. 8 '
2. Piazza and Butterworth-Exemption Only Applies to
the Reserve System.
In 1993, the District Court of Pennsylvania conducted a
detailed analysis of baseball's antitrust exemption in Piazza
v. Major League Baseball'83 and came to the conclusion that it
applied only to the reserve clause.' That case was later fol-
lowed in Butterworth v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs.' Both the rationale for limiting the exemp-
tion to the reserve clause expressed in these two cases and
the policies behind them are very persuasive. However, there
is no uniformity among the federal circuit courts. Therefore,
Congress must act to ensure that the owners cannot operate
the business of baseball without regard for antitrust laws.
The consequences of the exemption being limited to the
reserve system would allow suits such as Steinbrenner's
against the other owners. Regardless of whether or not his
suit is successful, his complaint demonstrates the economic
harm that collusive behavior can have on the business of
baseball. When owners must disclose confidential informa-
tion to competitors, 86 it reduces the incentive to effectively
market their team. While Steinbrenner did agree with the
179. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
180. Flood, 407 U.S. at 281.
181. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
182. Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993);
Butterworth v. National League of Prof1 Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla.
1994).
183. 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993); see discussion supra Part III.B.4.
184. Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 437; see discussion supra Part II.B.3.
185. 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994).
186. Steve Zipay, Boss In Trouble: Suit May Lead to Ban, NEWSDAY, May 8,
1997, at A94.
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other owners when he signed an agreement in 1984 to share
licensing and merchandising income, teams in other sports
have been able to strike deals with shoe companies to in-
crease revenue and promote the team." ' When Dallas Cow-
boys' Owner Jerry Jones struck side deals with Nike, Pepsi,
and American Express, all competitors of companies with
which the NFL has contracts, 8 ' the NFL filed suit against
Jones for $300 million.'9 The suit alleged that Jones violated
terms of a 1963 agreement creating NFL properties to mar-
ket the club and NFL trademarks jointly.'9 ° This agreement
is extremely comparable to the baseball pact that baseball
owners claimed Steinbrenner was breaking.
However, the significance of the difference between how
the antirust exemption is applied in the two sports creates
the disparity in how the cases are handled. Jones counter-
sued NFL Properties, claiming it violated antitrust laws. As
a result, the NFL dropped its suit against Jones and Jones
retained the fruits of his efforts.'9 ' On the contrary, because
baseball owners are shielded by the antitrust laws, they can
stand firm on not allowing Steinbrenner's suit to deter their
position.
This dichotomy in the interpretation of the law results in
economic disparity between baseball and all other sports.
Where, in some instances, the owners favor the exemption
because it benefits them economically as a whole, as in
blocking franchise relocation;'92 in other aspects, the exemp-
tion hinders owners individually, as in the Steinbrenner suit.
Because of this inconsistency, Congress needs to pass a bill
limiting the exemption to the reserve clause so that baseball
owners can be held accountable for anti-competitive behavior,
as are all other sports-under the Rule of Reason analysis.
3. Franchise Relocation and Restraint on Trade:
Applying Other Sports' Restrictions to Baseball
Baseball's exemption has allowed the owners to combine
187. Dallas Cowboys Drop Suits, supra note 104.
188. Peter King, Making Waves: SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 7, 1996, at 34.
The has a long-term contract with Coke, other sporting good companies, and
Visa is the league's official credit card. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Dallas Cowboys Drop Suits, supra note 104.
192. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
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forces and restrict the free movement of existing major
league franchises.9 All other sports are governed by the
Rule of Reason analysis regarding efforts to restrict franchise
moves.19 In the case of Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Commission v. National Football League, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that Rule 4.3 of Article IV of
the NFL Constitution could be an unreasonable restraint on
trade, and it was up to a jury to decide the question based on
the particular facts of the case.195 Article 4.3 was a restriction
in the NFL bylaws that required three-fourths of the team
owners to vote affirmatively to approve a franchise reloca-
tion. "'96 The Court thus reinstated a judgment finding the
NFL liable to the Raiders and the Los Angeles Coliseum, and
enjoining the NFL from preventing the Raiders from relo-
cating to Los Angeles.'97
The Piazza and Butterworth cases represent a major
problem with a broad exemption applying to franchise reloca-
tion. When the owners were allowed to block the sale or
move of a franchise without regard for the antitrust laws,'98
the game is harmed. The restriction on franchise relocation
shelters the owners from the market forces that have allowed
other professional sports, such as basketball and football, to
thrive.9 Indeed, professional football and basketball, which
have climbed in fan popularity while baseball has suffered,
are not given an exemption which renders them untouchable
from the antitrust laws that restrict the conduct of most en-
193. See discussion infra Part III.B.4.
194. See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football
League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984) (concluding that the unique structure of
the NFL precludes application of the per se rule); Los Angeles Memorial Coli-
seum Comm'n v. National Football League, 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986)
(upholding treble damages awarded to the Raiders and the Los Angeles Coli-
seum).
195. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League,
726 F.2d 1381, 1401 (9th Cir. 1984).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993); But-
terworth v. National League of Profl Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla.
1994).
199. Senate Panel Narrowly Approves Bill to Strip Baseball's Exemption (last
modified Aug. 3, 1995) <http://somerset.nando. net/newsroom.. ./feat/
archive/090395/mlb69021.html> (quoting Sen. Hatch) (copy on file with the
Santa Clara Law Review).
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terprises. °° Baseball had an average attendance of 28,288
fans per game in 1997, totaling just over 63,000,000 for all
thirty major league teams."1 This is just slightly higher than
the attendance from 1995 of 52,000,000 and 1996 of
60,000,000, but still down from the seventy million who at-
tended games in 1993. In addition, baseball's television rat-
ings in 1995 were at 22% of adults who watch television,
down 9% from 1993.02 The main reason for baseball's reduc-
tion in fan interest was the last players' strike.0 3 Therefore,
if lifting the antitrust exemption will lessen the chance of la-
bor discord, as this comment suggests it would,0 4 then Con-
gress must act to remove the exemption to restore baseball to
its status as the preeminent professional sport in terms of
fan interest.
Economic principles dictate that this standard should not
be applied to baseball. By isolating baseball away from mar-
ket forces, the game is being harmed by apathy from the
fans. Baseball owners are allowed to extort huge amounts of
money for expansion teams to enter the league, with the new
teams in Arizona and Tampa Bay paying a record $130 mil-
lion dollars each to enter the league in 1998.05 Indeed, the
financial incentives that the exemption allows seem to pre-
dict that the owners would rather block a move of an existing
team to a prospective expansion site so they could enjoy the
expansion fees, as opposed to allowing a single team owner to
gain all the benefit. There is no more obvious example than
200. In the 1995-1996 season, the National Basketball Association recorded
its highest ever attendance, averaging 17,252 points a game. David DuPree,
Attendance Takes an Early Tumble, USA TODAY, Jan. 9, 1997, at 6C. In fact,
NBA attendance has risen every year since the 1991-92 season. Id. Although
football attendance was down by 3.6% in 1996, with an average in-house atten-
dance of 57,166 fans per game, that is due to a huge drop in a few teams, in-
cluding the lameduck Houston which was playing its last season in Houston
before it moved Nashville, Tennessee for the 1998 season. Mark Gaughan, At-
tendance Count Surges to Second Best in the NFL, BUFFALO NEWS, Jan. 1, 1997,
at 1C.
201. Major League Baseball Attendance Report (visited Apr. 27, 1997)
<http://www.afnews.org/newsroom/sports/bbo/1997/mlb/mlb/stat/attend.html>
(copy on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
202. Shannon Dortch, The Future of Baseball, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Apr.
1996, at 22, available in LEXIS, News Library, Amdem File.
203. Id.
204. See supra Part IV.
205. The Arizona Diamondbacks-The News Wire-Time Line (visited Jan. 10,
1997) <http://www.azdiamondbacks.com/news/timeline.html> [hereinafter Ari-
zona Diamondbacks] (copy on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
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the new team in Tampa Bay. The fact that an expansion
team was granted to the city is evidence that the owners be-
lieve it is a viable environment for Major League Baseball;
however, the owners blocked the Giants from moving there
before the 1992 season.0 6 This blockage allowed the owners
to collect the huge franchise fee." 7 If traditional antitrust
laws were applied to this action, a court would be able to as-
sess the facts surrounding the move in the same fashion as
they were analyzed in the Raiders case and most likely find it
to be an unreasonable restraint of trade and a violation of
section 1 of the Act.
4. Spirit of Competition Should Be Focus for Baseball's
Success
While opponents of lifting the exemption may argue that
it provides stability to the game,08 this is a naive assumption.
Baseball is a sport which emphasizes competition. Capital-
ism also requires competition to operate efficiently. Thus,
the two interests should coincide. By applying Justice Bran-
dies' Rule of Reason analysis to determine if the restraint
imposed "merely regulates and perhaps.., promotes compe-
tition, or whether it ... suppress[es] or ... destroy[s] compe-
tition,"09 the interests of both baseball and the Act promoting
competition are protected.
In order for baseball to flourish as a sport, there must be
competition both on and off the field. If a team is so good
that there is no doubt that it will defeat all of its opponents,
or so bad that it has no chance, then the sport will not gener-
ate interest. In a perfect league, all the teams will have a
chance of winning against any opponent on any given day.
The only way this could happen is if the league operated in
the best interest of competition. If the owners are protected
206. See Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993);
see also Butterworth v. National League of Profl Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d
1021 (Fla. 1994). The author would like to stress that as a San Francisco Gi-
ants fan, the owner's collusion allowed me to continue to enjoy the Giants in
San Francisco. However, since baseball is indeed a business no different from
other professional sports, its antitrust actions should be evaluated under the
same guidelines.
207. Arizona Diamondbacks, supra note 205.
208. Clark C. Griffith, Letter to New York Times (visited Nov. 3, 1996)
<http://www.visi.com/-ccgpa/nyltr.html> (on file with the Santa Clara Law Re-
view).
209. Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 231 (1918).
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from antitrust laws, they are not forced to act this way.
Since the owners are able to block a franchise move through
any sort of combining they wish, a team owner who is losing
money and wishes to move his franchise is not able to take
advantage of a move to a city that could offer him a better
opportunity for a successful franchise. Tradition is an impor-
tant part of baseball and a city that has been the home of a
team deserves to keep the team if it is supported by a strong
fan base. However, tradition should not allow the owners to
conspire to restrain trade by blocking franchise relocations,
especially when their motivation is higher profits for them-
selves. Clearly a non-competitive team playing to less than
half capacity crowds serves no one's interest. Therefore,
baseball owners should be subject to Rule of Reason analysis
to determine if a particular restraint on franchise relocation
is unreasonable. Under this situation, the courts can factor
in the tradition of a team in a certain city in its reasonable-
ness analysis, thereby allowing the sanctity of the game to be
balanced with modern economic principles.
5. Supreme Court Following of Piazza and Butterworth
Unlikely
While the Piazza and Butterworth's rationale that base-
ball's exemption is limited to the reserve clause is reason-
able,21° there is no reason to believe that rationale would be
followed by the Supreme Court. The Court has acknowledged
that the antitrust exemption granted to baseball is an aber-
ration confined to baseball which "rests on a recognition and
an acceptance of baseball's unique characteristics and
needs."21' The Court also stressed in Flood that since Con-
gress has not acted even after what has now been almost
sixty-five years since the decision in Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore was handed down, then Congress must not have
intended baseball to be subjected to the antitrust laws. 12
Since Congress still has not acted, the Supreme Court will
not likely limit the exemption to the reserve clause.
The Supreme Court has an obligation to uphold prece-
dent in order to preserve the sanctity of the Court and allow
it to set the laws that people rely on in making decisions in
210. See discussion supra Part IV.
211. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972).
212. Id.
1250 [Vol. 38
1998] BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
their lives."'3 Since baseball has been left to develop since
1922 based on the holding in Federal Baseball Club of Balti-
more and its progeny, the Court would be ignoring its obliga-
tion as a standard setter by now limiting a decision this late
in baseball's development. 14 For this reason the only solution
to limit or eliminate baseball's antitrust exemption is
through Congress, and it has been far too long in the waiting.
C. Significance of Congressional Action
1. Good Chance of Congressional Action in the Future
Despite over seventy years of Congressional inaction
since the Supreme Court's ruling in Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore,215 there is good reason to believe that Congress is
poised to remove the exemption."6 First, lobbyists for the
players claim that the resignation of Bob Dole as Senate
Majority Leader is a major step in getting the exemption
lifted.217 Senator Dole has a close friendship with a major
baseball lobbyist, which lobbyists for the players claim was a
major factor in Senator Dole blocking the legislation in the
last session.1 8 In addition, Dole's replacement, Senator Trent
Lott, a Republican from Mississippi, had been an original
sponsor of antitrust legislation in the past.1 9 Furthermore,
Senator Hatch, a co-sponsor of Senate Bill 627, claimed that
he had the sixty votes necessary to invoke cloture22' and in-
sure that a vote be taken.2 '
The bill which the owners and players have agreed to
draft is only a stepping stone to addressing the entire prob-
lem that baseball owners' insulation from antitrust laws has
caused. While removing the exemption from labor is very
important, it is not the comprehensive measure that is
needed. The owners must not be able to continue to rebuke
213. See supra note 58.
214. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
215. See supra Part III.B.3
216. See Ed Henry, Major League Lobbying: Baseball Owners, Players Slug
It Out on Capitol Hill, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 10, 1996, at 1H.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. "Cloture" is a legislative rule whereby a filibuster is ended to permit a
vote to be taken. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990).
221. Ed Henry, Major League Lobbying: Baseball Owners, Players Slug It
Out on Capitol Hill, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 10, 1996, at 1H.
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market forces and prohibit teams losing money from moving
in order to pad their own pockets with lucrative expansion
fees.
2. Effect on Labor if Congress Lifts Exemption
While it has been said that baseball's antitrust exemp-
tion is moot because of the prevalence of collective bargaining
agreements and the decisions in Piazza and Butterworth,2
this is clearly not so. During the recent strike, the MLBPA
said that they would end the strike if Congress repealed the
exemption.2 3 In addition, a provision in the recent collective
bargaining agreement called for both the players and the
owners to jointly go to Congress to ask for the exemption to
be repealed. 4 These actions demonstrate that there is a
bargaining advantage, whether real or perceived, which ex-
ists in the owners having the exemption. As this current
collective bargaining agreement expires in 2000 or 2001,
there is a great chance that there will be labor discord, as
there has been more often than not since 1972 when an
agreement expired.2 5 If the MLBPA and the owners cannot
reach an agreement when the Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment expires, then the player's union may dissolve and sue
the owners for antirust violations if the exemption is lifted.
This ability to sue will serve to balance the bargaining scale
more evenly, since the suit will only be valid if the owners ac-
tually did collude to restrain trade.
3. Exemption Would Provide Uniformity
McCoy v. Major League Baseball,26 the most recent case
addressing the scope of baseball's antitrust exemption, re-
jected the rationale in Piazza that the exemption should be
limited to the reserve clause.2 This decision demonstrated
that there is no uniformity in the decisions as to the extent of
baseball's exemption. Where one court may lift the exemp-
222. Joseph. A. Kohm, Jr., Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: It's Going, Going,
Gone!, 20 NOVA L. REV. 1231 (1996).
223. Players Vow to End Strike if Exemption Repealed (visited Nov. 3, 1996)
<http://www.nando.net/newsroomiap/bbo/1995/mlb/mlb/02119573306.html>
(copy on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
224. Lennon, supra note 142, at A90.
225. Baseball Labor Chronology, supra note 5.
226. 911 F. Supp. 454 (1995).
227. Id. at 458.
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tion for franchise relocation issues, another may not. There-
fore, it is imperative that Congress pass legislation lifting the
exemption altogether in order to allow baseball to operate
under a uniform system of laws.
IV. PROPOSAL
Congressional abstinence from addressing baseball's ex-
emption to the antitrust laws has allowed the baseball own-
ers to operate the business of baseball without regard for the
laws that govern all other industries. While it is true that
baseball has long been recognized as the preeminent Ameri-
can sport,2 28 this is no reason to allow the owners of the teams
to operate above the law.
The ideal legislation to lift the exemption should include
the thrust of the Curt Flood Act in regards to labor, as well
as the removal for franchise relocations. Therefore, all collu-
sive behavior which is not exempted from statutory or non-
statutory labor laws will be governed under Rule of Reason
analysis. The owners would no longer be allowed to block
franchise relocations without pro-competitive justifications
which outweigh their anticompetitive effects. Furthermore,
the baseball owners would no longer be allowed to extort
huge sums of money from expansion cities by preventing
them from acquiring an existing team in financial distress
without justifying their decision with pro-competitive effects.
V. CONCLUSION
Baseball has recently suffered a period of fan disillu-
sionment and disenchantment and has become less the na-
tional pastime it once was.229 While the new collective bar-
gaining agreement offers the fans at least five years of
uninterrupted play, there is still fear that embracing the
game will only lead to more heartache for the fans.23 ' There
needs to be a more encompassing solution to bring the game
back to its standing as the quintessential representation of
American boyhood dreams on a summer afternoon. A major
step in that direction is congressional legislation. "Congress
may not be able to solve every problem or heal baseball's self-
228. See supra note 8.
229. Shelton, supra note 166, at Cl.
230. Id.
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inflicted wounds, but [it] can do this:.., pass legislation that
will declare that professional baseball can no longer operate
above the law.23' Indeed, if the policy reasons for allowing
Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore and its progeny to stand
was to protect the sanctity of America's pastime,232 then the
exemption must now be lifted in order to do the same. In-
deed, "it is time that the [Congress] act and end this destruc-
tive aberration of the law.""3
While baseball is a game that transcends all economic
and social barriers, baseball owners operate their clubs as a
business, and businesses must pay attention to profits. Con-
gressional action to lift baseball's antitrust exemption may
appear to the owners to be detriment to revenue in the short-
run for the owners, as they may not be able to use the exemp-
tion for their financial benefit.234 However, the owners also
make a great deal of money on television contracts and ticket
prices. '35 If the business and labor strife keep the game on
the field from being played, then fans will become even more
disinterested and the owners will suffer in the long run.
In order to preserve baseball as both a viable business
and the national pastime, Congress must enact legislation
treating baseball as a business, subject to antitrust scrutiny.
The Curt Flood Act, which has an excellent chance of passing
in the next session, would be an excellent step in restoring
the game. Ideally, a more encompassing bill similar to the
one proposed in this paper would be implemented. Such a
bill, as proffered in this comment, would be much more effec-
tive in limiting the chance of labor discord after the current
agreement expires would provide a long-run equitable solu-
tion to may of the maladies to distract from the game.
Joshua Hamilton
231. 141 CONG. REc. S8992 (daily ed. June 23, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
232. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 279 (1972).
233. S. 627, 104th Cong. (1996).
234. See discussion supra Part IV.
235. Dortch, supra note 202, at 22.
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1254 [Vol. 38
